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Metamemory is a person’s knowledge about their own memory. Metamemory
judgments are sometimes accurate and sometimes not. Eakin (2005) found a dissociation 
between metamemory predictions and memory performance under conditions of 
retroactive interference and attributed this dissociation to the accessibility heuristic. This 
study investigated whether the accessibility heuristic would be used to make
metamemory predictions in the more complex context of the eyewitness memory
paradigm. The results indicate that the accessibility heuristic was used to make
metamamory predictions. Memory performance was better for control than misled critical 
items, but people predicted they would perform equally well in both conditions. It 
appears that in the less austere context of the eyewitness memory paradigm, the amount
of information accessible for control and misled items was equal, and therefore, 
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Metamemory is a person’s knowledge about their own memory (Flavell, 1979). 
Metamemory includes judgments about how well new material has been learned, how 
likely it is an answer on a test will be retrieved, and the confidence held in a retrieved 
answer. Metamemory is sometimes accurate (Leibert & Nelson, 1998; Maki, 1999;
Schreiber & Nelson, 1998) and sometimes not (Chandler, 1994; Eakin, 2005; Metcalf, 
Schwartz, & Joaquim, 1993). For instance, Eakin found a dissociation between 
metamemory predictions and memory performance under conditions of retroactive
interference. Retroactive interference occurs when a cue word is paired with two target 
words (interference condition) rather than only one target word (control condition); the
two targets interfere with each other at retrieval resulting in lower recall in the 
interference than the control condition. Eakin found that, opposite to recall, people gave
higher metamemory predictions in the interference than the control condition. Eakin 
attributed the inaccurate metamemory predictions to the accessibility heuristic. Rather 
than base predictions on direct access to the impact of interference on memory itself, 
people incorrectly inferred that if more information was accessible in the interference







   
  
   









   
 
  
Template Created By: Damen Peterson 2009
inference that accessibility to more information will lead to successful memory is 
warranted (Koriat, 1975, 1976); however, in the case of retroactive interference, that 
same information actually leads to poor memory. 
In the typical retroactive interference paradigm, in which word pairs are studied, it 
is relatively apparent whether a cue is associated with one or with two targets – a detail 
that may contribute to the use of accessibility when making metamemory predictions. 
This study presented the control and interference conditions in a paradigm that allowed 
for a richer, more complex context surrounding the critical experimental items than was 
available using the typical retroactive interference paradigm. The goal was to determine
whether presenting the control and interfering information in a rich context, surrounded 
with much detail would obscure the difference between the number of targets associated 
with the cues between the control and interference conditions. The eyewitness memory
paradigm affords such a condition, and this paradigm will be discussed further. First, 
however, a more detailed review of the literature on metamemory and retroactive
interference will be presented. 
Metamemory
Nelson and Narens (1990) were the first to develop a unifying framework of 
metamemory. Nelson and Narens organized their framework according to three stages of 
memory: acquisition, retention, and retrieval. New material is learned during the 
acquisition phase, and a metamemory judgment made during this phase may include
judging how well that information has been learned. This immediate judgment of
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recall) to predict recall of the item on a future test (e.g., Dunlosky & Matvey, 2001; 
Koriat, 1997; Koriat & Bjork, 2005; Vesonder & Voss, 1985). The retention phase
involves maintaining learned information over some period of time; metamemory
predictions can also be collected during the retention period. A delayed JOL (DJOL) is a
metamemory prediction that is frequently made after acquisition but before the 
subsequent retrieval phase (e.g., Nelson & Dunlosky, 1991, 1992; Kimball & Metcalfe, 
2003; Spellman & Bjork, 1992). During the retrieval phase, recall is attempted for
previously learned information.  After recall, a metamemory judgment can be collected 
about future recognition of unrecalled information.  This type of prediction is a feeling of 
knowing (FOK) judgment (e.g., Hart, 1965; Miner & Reder, 1994; Nelson, Leonesio, 
Landwehr, & Narens, 1986; Schacter, 1983). Finally, either after recall or recognition of 
all items, or on an item-by-item basis, confidence judgment (CJs) can be collected. CJs 
are retrospective judgments that assess confidence in the accuracy of information that 
was just retrieved (Fischhoff, Slovic, & Lichtenstein, 1977; Koriat, Lichtenstein, &
Fischhoff, 1980). Nelson and Narens’ framework laid the foundation for researchers to 
compare and contrast the different aspects of metamemory, including what sources of 
information are used when making metamemory judgments. 
Schwartz (1994) summarized the two opposing viewpoints about the source of 
metamemory judgments: the direct access view and the inferential view. The direct-
access view states that a person has direct access to the actual memory representation of 
an item when making a metamemory judgment (Hart, 1967; Burke, MacKay, Worthley, 
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state of the target in memory when making metamemory judgments; if the target is in an 
accessible state, metamemory predictions are high and vice versa. Therefore, if people 
rely on the state of the target, their metamemory predictions should always accurately
reflect future memory outcome. However, there is evidence that metamemory does not
always reflect memory performance (e.g., Eakin, 2005; Eakin & Hertzog, 2010a; 2010b;
Rhodes & Castel, 2008). Because of findings of dissociation between metamemory and 
memory, little support has been provided for the direct access view; most research has 
validated the inferential view. 
The inferential view states that a person uses sources of information other than the 
actual memory representation to make metamemory judgments. According to the
inferential view, people do not have direct access to the state of the target in memory; 
they must use cue-based and target-based information to infer the state of the target when 
making their predictions. Two examples of cue-based heuristics used to make
metamemory judgments are cue familiarity and accessibility. Cue familiarity will be
discussed first.
The cue familiarity hypothesis states that metamemory predictions are based on 
the familiarity of the cue at the time of prediction: Metamemory predictions should be
higher when the cue is more familiar (Metcalf, Schwartz, & Joaquim, 1993). Metcalf et 
al. tested the cue familiarity hypothesis under conditions of proactive interference by
manipulating the number of times a cue was presented. Participants studied a list of cue-
target pairs in which a cue A was paired with target B. Participants were instructed that 
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second half of cue-target pairs. For some pairs, the same cue A was repeated and paired 
with either the same target B, a related target B’, or an unrelated target D. Other pairs 
contained a new cue C paired with a new target D. Participants were instructed at test to 
recall the most recent target encountered. The cue familiarity hypothesis predicted that 
metamemory predictions would be higher for the conditions in which the cue had been 
seen more than once (e.g., conditions A-B A-B, A-B A-B’, and A-D A-B); condition C-D 
A-B should have had the lowest metamemory predictions, because the cue had only been 
seen once. This finding was obtained: Metamemory predictions were higher for
conditions in which the cue was seen multiple times, supporting the cue familiarity
hypothesis. Although memory performance was better for the A-B A-B and A-B A-B’ 
conditions than the A-D A-B and C-D A-B conditions, metamemory predictions were
higher for conditions A-B A-B, A-B A-B’, and A-D A-B. Therefore, metamemory
tracked the pattern predicted by the cue familiarity hypothesis rather than that obtained in 
memory, also providing support for the inferential view. Metcalf et al. concluded people 
were inferring that more familiar cues would lead to better memory than those less 
familiar cues. Cue familiarity apparently is one type of information that is used when 
inferring future memory performance. However, it is not the only one. The accessibility
hypothesis suggests another heuristic on which people base inferences about memory.
The accessibility hypothesis states that metamemory predictions are based on the 
amount of information that “comes to mind” at the time of retrieval given the cue (Koriat, 
1993). Rather than basing predictions on direct access to the state of the target in 
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the cue. For instance, predictions might be higher for future memory about the capital of 
a country for which more information is accessible (e.g., Australia) as opposed to one 
about which little other information is accessible (e.g., Kyrgyzstan). Koriat tested his 
accessibility hypothesis by associating the amount of information accessible with 
metamemory predictions. First, on each trial, participants studied a nonsense string of 
four letters. Then, participants were asked to recall as many letters as possible from the 
string on a free recall test. Finally, participants made an FOK prediction about future
recognition of that letter string, and then their memory was tested on a recognition test. 
Koriat found that as the number of letters recalled in the testing phase increased, FOK
predictions also increased regardless of whether the recalled letters were correct. Koriat 
concluded that participants were basing their metamemory predictions on the amount of 
information accessible, even if this information was inaccurate. Both the cue familiarity
hypothesis and accessibility hypothesis provide evidence for the inferential view of 
metamemory judgments. The role of each of these hypotheses in terms of their ability to 
explain the dissociation between metamemory and memory under retroactive interference
will be discussed next.    
Metamemory and Interference
Rhodes and Castel (2008) examined metamemory predictions under conditions of 
interference at retrieval. Interference at retrieval was produced using a technique called 
part-set cuing. Part-set cuing is a phenomenon first observed by Slamecka (1968) in 
which participants first study a set of words in anticipation of a memory test. Memory
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participants are asked to recall the entire set of words. On the part-set cued test, 
participants are provided with some of the to-be-recalled words and have to recall words 
that are not included in the partial set. Rather than aid memory, performance is typically
worse for participants who receive part of the set as compared to those who have to 
remember the entire set, a finding known as the part-set cuing effect. The effect is 
obtained, because the partial set of items interferes with retrieval of the remaining items. 
Rhodes and Castel tested whether people could provide accurate metamemory predictions
under conditions of part-set-cueing. Although they obtained typical part-set cuing effects 
in memory – memory performance was worse for participants in the part-set cueing
condition than in the control condition – metamemory predictions were the same 
regardless of cueing condition. Predictions were not sensitive to the interference that 
occurred due to part-set cueing; memory and metamemory were dissociated. Eakin 
(2005) found similar results under conditions of retroactive interference using a special 
test that mimics part-set cueing.
Eakin (2005) examined metamemory for retroactive interference. She modified 
the typical retroactive interference paradigm – which consists of an original list encoding
phase, an interpolated list encoding phase, and a test phase – by adding a metamemory
prediction phase before the test phase (see Table 1). During the original list encoding
phase, participants studied a list of cue-target paired associates (e.g. JEWELRY-
EARRINGS); both the experimental group and the control group learned the same pairs. 
During the interpolated list encoding phase, participants in the control group studied a


















Template Created By: Damen Peterson 2009
in the experimental group studied a second list of paired associates in which the original 
cue was paired with a new target (e.g. JEWELRY-BRACELET). During the 
metamemory phase, the original list cue was presented (e.g., JEWELRY), and people 
made DJOL predictions about subsequent recall of the original target using the 0-100 
scale. During the test phase, memory for the target from the original list was tested using
the Modified Opposition Test (MOT; e.g., Eakin, Schreiber, & Sergent-Marshall, 2003). 
The MOT instructs participants that information on the interpolated list was inaccurate 
and to only respond with targets from the original list. The test also provides the
interpolated target as a hint about which target is incorrect (e.g., JEWELRY – [hint: not
BRACELET]). This hint produces interference in a way similar to the part-set cueing
technique used by Rhodes and Castel (2008); the hint (e.g., BRACELET) serves as a
partial set of two potential targets and creates interference for memory of the missing set 
member (e.g., EARRINGS). Using the MOT, Eakin obtained the typical retroactive
interference effect in memory: recall was better for the control than for the experimental 
condition. The opposite pattern was obtained in metamemory, however. Predictions were
higher in the interference than the control condition – the very condition in which 
memory performance was worse. Therefore metamemory and memory were dissociated 
under retroactive interference. 
The retroactive interference effect has been attributed to response competition 
(McGeoch, 1942). In the experimental condition, because the cue is paired with both an 
original and interpolated list target, when the cue is presented for retrieval of the original 
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it can block access to the original list target, resulting in retrieval blocking, a particularly
strong form of response competition. Retrieval blocking is likely on the MOT, because
the interpolated list target is present at test as the hint. A theoretical basis of retrieval 
blocking is proposed by the Search of Associate Memory Model (SAM; Gillund &
Shiffrin, 1984; Raaijmakers & Shiffrin, 1981) which states that when a cue elicits the 
retrieval of a target, the prior association between this cue-target pair in memory is 
strengthened. In Eakin’s study, the hint on the test (e.g. JEWELRY-[hint: not 
BRACELET]) ensures retrieval of the interpolated list target (e.g., BRACELET), and the 
prior association between the cue and the interpolated list phase target that was 
established in the interference condition is strengthened. This strengthened association 
ensures that whenever the cue is presented, the most likely target for retrieval will be the
interpolated list target. Each time that target is retrieved in conjunction with the cue, the 
association between the two is further strengthened. The end result is retrieval blocking: 
the repeated retrieval of the interpolated target blocks access to the original list target. 
Using the MOT, Eakin obtained a significant retroactive interference effect in memory. 
The control group outperformed the experimental group for memory of the original list 
targets. However, metamemory predications showed the opposite pattern. A dissociation 
between memory and metamemory was obtained: predictions were higher in the 
experimental condition than the control condition. Apparently, people were basing their 
predictions on some factor other than the direct impact on memory of retroactive
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Table 1
Eakin’s (2005) Modified Retroactive Interference Paradigm

















Theoretical Bases of Metamemory
As discussed previously, the two main viewpoints about the basis of metamemory
predictions are the direct-access and inferential views. The dissociation between memory
and metamemory obtained by Eakin (2005; see also Eakin & Hertzog, 2006; 2010a; 
2010b; Rhodes & Castel, 2008) suggests that predictions about future memory outcome
were based on some factor other than direct access to the memory trace itself. Eakin 
explored two inferential theories as a potential bases for the dissociation that occurred 
under retroactive interference: cue familiarity and accessibility. Cue familiarity states that 
metamemory predictions are based on the familiarity of the cue at the time of prediction 
(Metcalf et. al., 1993). Eakin tested the cue familiarity heuristic by including a cueing
procedure for which the cue was not encountered until the metamemory prediction phase. 
The typical cueing procedure is the intralist procedure for which the cue-target pairs are
studied together. Eakin added an extralist cueing procedure in which participants studied 
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list encoding phase (e.g., LADDER). During the metamemory prediction phase, 
participants see the cue (e.g., STEP) for the first time. If participants relied on familiarity
with the cue, their predictions would be higher in the intralist cueing procedure – and 
highest in the intralist, interference condition – for which the cue has been encountered 
prior to prediction. Predictions would be lower in the extralist cueing procedure for which 
the cue has never been encountered. Although metamemory predictions were slightly
higher in the intralist interference conditions, differences were small and not significant. 
The dissociation between memory and metamemory that occurred can not be completely
explained by cue familiarity theory. The accessibility hypothesis, however, can explain 
Eakin’s results.  
Eakin (2005) determined that the accessibility hypothesis best explained the
dissociation she obtained. The accessibility hypothesis states that metamemory
predictions are based on the amount of information that is accessed at the time of
retrieval, given the cue (Koriat, 1993). Because the cue is paired with two targets in the 
interference condition, more information is potentially accessible at prediction as 
compared to the control condition for which the cue is paired with only one target. 
Therefore, the accessibility hypothesis predicts that metamemory predictions should be
higher in the interference than the control condition, and that finding was obtained by
Eakin. The question posited by the proposed study is whether accessibility will influence
metamemory predictions when the distinction in terms of the amount of information 
between the interference and control conditions is obscured by increasing the complexity
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The Study 
Eakin (2005) showed that metamemory and memory were dissociated under 
conditions of retroactive interference using the typical retroactive interference paradigm. 
Because the materials used were cue-target paired associates, the difference in terms of
the amount of information associated with each cue was apparent. Therefore, participants 
could easily identify the cues for which more information was accessible when they were
making their predictions. This study examined under what conditions accessibility does 
and does not influence metamemory predictions about retroactive interference. The
research question explored was whether people used the accessibility heuristic in a more
complex, less austere context in which the difference in the amount of target information 
between the interference and control conditions is less apparent. The paradigm that 
provided such a condition is the eyewitness memory paradigm.
The eyewitness memory paradigm is similar to the retroactive interference
paradigm in that it consists of the same phases: an original phase, an interpolated phase, 
and a test phase. During the original phase, rather than study cue-target word pairs, 
participants witness an event via a slideshow. During the witnessed event, participants 
see critical items (e.g., a pair of earrings) for which their memory will later be tested 
(e.g., What jewelry?). During the interpolated phase, participants read a narrative that 
describes the witnessed slide event. The critical items are also mentioned in the narrative, 
but control items are mentioned in a generic way (e.g., jewelry) whereas interference
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misinformation effects is parallel to retroactive interference effects: memory is better for
control than interference items.
For this study, the eyewitness memory paradigm was modified by adding a
metamemory phase. In order to examine metamemory, a metamemory prediction phase
was added after the narrative and prior to the MOT test. After viewing the original event 
via the slide show and reading the narrative, the test question was provided along with the
hint (e.g., What jewelry? Hint: NOT BRACELET) and, using a scale of 0 – 100, 
participants made a DJOL predicting how likely it was they would be able to provide the
correct answer on a future test. Then each test question was provided again on the MOT, 
and participants attempted to provide the correct answer. If memory and metamemory
were dissociated, this finding would provide evidence that accessibility influenced 
metamemory predictions even in the richer context of the eyewitness memory paradigm. 
However, if the two were associated, this finding would provide evidence that the
accessibility heuristic was not used to make metamemory judgments, perhaps because the 
richer context of the eyewitness memory paradigm obscured the fact that the interference
cues were associated with multiple targets. In that case, some other heuristic may have
been used when making metamemory judgments (e.g., cue familiarity).
To test whether the cue familiarity heuristic was used when making metamemory
predictions, we also manipulated the number of times participants were exposed to the 
cue. To this end, the control manipulation of the critical items varied. Control items were
either mentioned in a generic way (control-present condition) or not mentioned at all 



















Template Created By: Damen Peterson 2009
the cue implicitly in the slideshow and explicitly in the narrative for a total of two 
exposures. In the control-absent condition, participants were only exposed to the cue
implicitly in the slideshow for a total of one exposure. If the cue familiarity heuristic was 
used when making metamemory judgments, because they experience the cue twice as 
often, participants in the control-present condition should have given higher predictions
than participants in the control-absent condition.
Another modification to the original eyewitness memory paradigm is that rather
than just view one slide show, in this experiment multiple slideshows were presented. 
Multiple slideshows were used in the experiment to increase the number of critical items 
from the typical four to six in a single slide show to a total of 31 that were seen 
throughout the four slideshows. This technique has been used previously: Roediger and
Geraci (2007) showed younger and older adults two separate slide shows in order to 
increase the number of critical items presented (see also Roediger, Jacoby, &
McDermott, 1996). Additional critical items were needed in this experiment because we
were not only assessing memory, but also metamemory. Metamemory predictions are
evaluated in terms of items that are recalled versus items that are not, and using only a
few critical items would not provide enough variability to assess this difference. The slide
shows were presented and then participants read the accompanying narrative associated 
with that slide show. After viewing all of the slide shows and reading the narratives, the 
MOT test questions were presented and participants provided DJOL predictions about 
future memory for critical items from the slide shows. Finally, their memory for those
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Confidence judgments were collected to examine whether participants’ experience of 
interference on the MOT influenced their post-test metamemory accuracy.   
In addition to the eyewitness memory paradigm providing a more complex
situation in which to test whether the accessibility heuristic was used to make
metamemory predictions, it also provided a situation where the results showed how 
metamemory responds in a real-world context. In Eakin (2005), people used the 
accessibility heuristic to make metamemory predictions in the controlled context of the
retroactive interference paradigm. The eyewitness memory paradigm showed if people 
used this same heuristic to make metamemory predictions when the context is more
ecologically valid.
Predictions
The first prediction was that a misinformation effect would occur: Participants’ 
recall accuracy would be higher for control critical items than misleading critical items. 
To test this prediction, paired-samples directional t tests were used to compare the mean 
recall accuracy for critical items from the control-present and misled conditions and from 
the control-absent and misled conditions. A power analysis with α = .05 and power at .80 
indicated that 61 participants were needed per condition to detect a small to moderate 
effect (d = .30 – expected based on previous research). 
Next, if the accessibility heuristic was used to make metamemory predictions, 
dissociation between memory performance and metamemory predictions is expected. 
Mean magnitude of DJOLs for misled critical items should be higher than mean 
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prediction, paired-samples nondirectional t tests were used to compare the mean DJOLs 
for critical items from the control-present and misled conditions and the control-absent 
and misled conditions. The nondirectional test was necessary, because prior research has 
indicated that metamemory predictions can be higher for interference than control items 
(e.g., Eakin, 2005). The pattern of results in terms of interference conditions between 
memory and metamemory were compared.
Last, if cue familiarity was used to make metamemory predictions, mean 
magnitude DJOLs should be higher for critical items in the control-present condition than 
critical items in the control-absent condition. To test this hypothesis, an independent one-
tailed t test was used on the mean magnitude of DJOLs between the control-present and 
control-absent conditions. A power analysis with α = .05 and power at .80 indicated that 
51 participants were needed per condition to detect a moderate effect size (d = .50).
Because the within subjects variable power analysis indicated that 61 participants were
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CHAPTER II
METHOD
Design and Participants 
The design was a 2 x 2 mixed factorial design. Control condition (control-present, 
control-absent) was manipulated between subjects and misled condition was manipulated 
within subjects (note, the misled items are the same for the two control conditions). A 
total of 392 undergraduate students participated for research credits. Participants were
recruited from undergraduate psychology classes using the Mississippi State Psychology
Department’s Sona-system’s website. There were 186 participants in the control-present 
condition and 190 in the control-absent condition. Participants were randomly assigned to 
the between-subjects conditions by random distribution of the control-present and 
control-absent booklets in each session. The experiment was administered in groups of 10 
to 15 students. 
Materials
Slideshows. Participants viewed four slideshows during the original encoding
phase (see Appendix A for sample scenes from each). The Maintenance Man is adapted 



















Template Created By: Damen Peterson 2009
money and a calculator while repairing a chair in an office. The Bookstore features a 
young man stealing several items while browsing in a college bookstore (Loftus, 1991). 
Nature Goods Store depicts an older and younger man shopping in a nature goods store. 
Finally, The Library pictures a young college student doing research in a library. 
Each slideshow had an accompanying narrative in which the critical items were
presented. The critical items and their slide versus narrative alternatives are listed in 
Table 2 included in Appendix B. Because the misleading information was a within-
subjects manipulation, each narrative contained critical items that had been manipulated 
for the two control and the misleading conditions. For the control-present condition, 
control critical items were mentioned in a generic way (e.g., JEWELRY); for the control-
absent condition, control critical items were not mentioned at all in the narrative. Misled 
critical items were mentioned in both control narratives (e.g., BRACELET). Critical 
items were counterbalanced across control and misled conditions. For instance, in the The
Maintenance Man narrative version A, the coffee jar critical item was misleading (e.g., 
Maxwell House). In The Maintenance Man narrative version B, the coffee jar was a
control item and was mentioned in a generic way or not at all, depending on which 
control condition was being used. The counterbalancing conditions and corresponding
misleading items for version A and B can also be seen in Appendix B.
Booklets. Written instructions, the post-event narratives, distracter task materials, 
and the final MOT test were presented in a booklet (for examples of post-event narratives 
and MOT test questions see Appendix C).  The cover page of the booklet included 
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first two pages of the booklet contained instructions and materials for completing the first 
distracter task. The task was to work a number crossword puzzle. Following the 
distracter task, the first post-event narrative was presented. After reading the post-event 
narrative, participants were instructed to stop and wait for everyone to finish. The second, 
third, and fourth slideshows were presented in this same manner: each followed by a
distracter task and post-event narrative. Following the fourth post-event narrative, 
participants completed a final distracter task and then completed the metamemory
prediction phase, the MOT, and the confidence judgment phase. The order of the
narratives followed that of the order of the slideshow presentation and the slideshow to 
which each question set referred was identified by the slideshow’s title.
Procedure
Participants were first asked into the room and instructed to sit where they could 
see the projector screen. A consent form (Appendix D) was placed on each desk before
the experiment began, and participants read and signed their consent form after entering
the room. When all consent forms were collected, participants were told that they would 
next view four slideshows and read four accompanying narratives. They were instructed 
that their memory for the slideshows would later be tested, so they should pay close 
attention to details in each slideshow. After the introduction to the first slideshow was 
read, participants viewed the first slideshow. Slideshow presentation order was varied 
according to the four orders listed in Table 2. The presentation order was randomly
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the control condition. The slides were presented at a rate of four seconds per slide. After 
the second presentation of the first slideshow, the experimenter distributed a booklet to 
each participant. Booklets were selected based on the slide presentation order, but 
randomly distributed in terms of whether they contained control-present or control-absent 
narratives (i.e., first desk got a control-present booklet, second desk got a control-absent 
booklet, and so forth). Participants were instructed not to open their booklet until the
experimenter instructed them to do so. Participants then completed the timed four minute
distracter task (i.e., number crossword puzzle). Participants received instructions on how 
to complete the puzzle in verbal and written form. After the distracter task, participants 
then read the accompanying narrative for the first slideshow. This procedure was 
repeated for each of the three remaining slideshows. 
Following the last narrative, a final four minute distracter task was completed. 
Next, participants made their metamemory predictions. Participants viewed each MOT 
critical item question and made a DJOL prediction on a 0-100 scale. Participants then 
completed a cumulative MOT consisting of 31 critical item questions. Following the 
MOT, participants made CJs for each critical item question. Finally, participants were
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Table 2
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CHAPTER III
RESULTS
Participants with a mean overall recall accuracy of less than .20 for control critical 
items were removed from the analysis (i.e., 47 participants were removed leaving a total 
of 345). An item-by-item analysis showed five critical items with an overall recall
accuracy of less than .20 in the control condition (i.e., Letter on mug, Tool, Wall
Decoration, Decorative Center Piece, and Equipment). These items were also removed 
from the analysis. 
The design was a 2 x 2 mixed factorial design. A repeated measures ANOVA was 
used to test for differences between the counterbalance conditions and the slideshow 
presentation orders with presentation of misinformation as the within-subjects factor and 
counterbalance condition and slideshow presentation order as the between-subjects 
factor. No differences were found between counterbalance 1 and counterbalance 2 
conditions, p = .59. There were also no differences found between slideshow presentation 
orders, p = .61 and no significant interaction, p = .45. Therefore, we collapsed across 
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Memory
Probability of recall. To test the prediction that a misinformation effect would 
occur, a paired-samples directional t test was performed on recall accuracy for the 
control-present and misled conditions and the control-absent and misled conditions. A 
misinformation effect was obtained in both the control-present condition, t(164) = 2.26, p
< .05 , ηρ ² = .03, and the control-absent condition, t(179) = 2.40, p < .05, ηρ² = .03; 
participants’ recall accuracy was higher in both the control-present condition (M = .50, 
SE = .01) and the control-absent condition (M = .51, SE = .01) than the misled condition 
(M = .47, SE = .02 for both misled conditions).
Metamemory
DJOLs. The pattern of results in terms of memory performance and metamemory
predictions was evaluated to determine whether a dissociation occurred between memory
and metamemory under retroactive interference. Because memory performance was 
higher in both control conditions, a dissociation between memory and metamemory
occurred if DJOLs were equal to or higher in the misled condition than its respective
control condition. Paired-samples nondirectional t tests were used to compare the mean 
DJOLs for each control condition to the misled condition. No difference was found, 
t(164) = .27, p = .22, ηρ ² < .01, between mean DJOLs for the control-present (M = 59.64,
SE = 1.32) and misled (M = 59.30, SE = 1.30) items or between mean DJOLs  for the 
control-absent (M = 58.11, SE = 1.23) and misled (M = 59.30, SE = 1.37) items, t(179) =
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predictions was found. Although memory performance was better for control critical 
items than misled critical items in both the control-present and control-absent conditions, 
participants predicted they would remember the control and misled critical items equally
well.  
To test whether cue familiarity influenced metamemory predictions, an 
independent non-directional t test was used to compare the DJOLs for the control-present 
condition and the control-absent condition. If cue familiarity influenced metamemory
predictions, mean DJOLs should be higher in the condition in which the cue was seen 
multiple times (i.e., the control-present condition). The test revealed no difference, t(343)
= .41, p = .69, ηρ ² < .01, between mean DJOLs in the control-absent condition (M = 
51.04, SE = 1.23) and the control-present condition (M = 50.31, SE = 1.32). The
dissociation that occurred between memory and metamemory predictions does not appear 
to be because people based their predictions on cue familiarity. 
A paired-samples nondirectional t test was used to compare overall mean DJOLs 
for recalled and unrecalled items. If people were systematic in making their metamemory
judgments at all, DJOLs should be higher for recalled than unrecalled items. Participants 
did give significantly higher DJOLs for recalled (M = 76.91, SE = .69) than unrecalled 
(M = 40.40, SE = .85) items, t(658) = 36.64, p < .01, ηρ² = .67. Metamemory judgments 
were sensitive to whether or not an item would later be recalled but were not sensitive to 
the control versus misled experimental manipulation. 
Confidence judgments. A paired-samples nondirectional t test was used to 
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participants used information based on their experience with interference during the test 
phase to inform metamemory predictions, CJs should reflect a different pattern than that 
obtained for DJOLs; mean CJs should be higher for control than misled items. However, 
this finding was not obtained. No difference was found between mean CJs for control (M
= 54.23, SE = 1.35) and misled (M = 54.72, SE = 1.45) items in the control-absent 
condition, t(179) = .44, p = .66, ηρ² < .01, or control (M = 54.90, SE = 1.48) and misled 
(M = 53.35, SE = 1.42) items in the control-present condition, t(164) = 1.23, p = .221, ηρ ² 
< .01. 
A paired-samples nondirectional t test was used to compare mean CJs for recalled 
and unrecalled items. Overall, participants gave higher mean CJs t(688) = 9.28, p < .01, 
ηρ² = .11 for recalled (M = 58.45, SE = .85) than unrecalled (M = 49.66, SE = .88) items;
however, the magnitude of the difference was not as large post-retrieval as it was pre-
retrieval. The difference was 36.51 for DJOLs and only 6.79 for CJs. Apparently, people 
did notice that their memory was not as good as they predicted, but did not appear to 
identify interference as the reason. Posttest metamemory judgments were not sensitive to 
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CHAPTER IV
DISCUSSION
Using the retroactive interference paradigm, Eakin (2005) found a dissociation 
between memory performance and metamemory predictions, and concluded that 
participants were using the accessibility heuristic to make their predictions. The current 
experiment examined whether the accessibility heuristic would influence metamemory
predictions in the complex context of the eyewitness memory paradigm. The typical 
finding of a misinformation effect was obtained in this study. When participants were
exposed to misleading information in the post-event narratives, they also experienced 
interference from those same items on the final test of memory for the witnessed event. 
Recall accuracy was better for control critical items than misled critical items. This
finding was obtained whether the critical items were represented generically in the
narrative or not mentioned at all; a misinformation effect was obtained in both the
control-present and control-absent conditions. Similar to those in the Eakin study, 
participants in the present study were not able to accurately predict the misinformation 
effect that occurred in memory. Although in the previous study participants mistakenly
thought misled items would be remembered better than control items, in this experiment 




















Template Created By: Damen Peterson 2009
Metamemory predictions did not differ between control and misled items. Therefore, 
although the double dissociation obtained by Eakin was not found, memory performance
and metamemory predictions were still dissociated in the present study. Although 
participants’ memory performance was better for control critical items, they predicted 
they would remember control and misled critical items equally well. 
Eakin (2005) attributed the double dissociation she obtained to influences on the 
metamemory predictions that were not diagnostic of memory performance. Specifically, 
she concluded that people relied on the amount of information that came to mind when 
making their predictions, a conclusion that is supported by the accessibility hypothesis 
(Koriat, 1993). The accessibility hypothesis states that metamemory predictions are based
on the amount of information accessed, given a cue, when making the prediction. In the 
controlled context of the retroactive interference paradigm used by Eakin, it could have
been apparent which cues had been paired with one target and which were paired with 
two targets. However, under the more complex, detailed conditions of the eyewitness 
memory paradigm, this feature may have been obscured, leading to metamemory
predictions that more closely tracked memory.  The findings suggest that this may have
been the case. Even under the complex, detailed conditions of the eyewitness memory
paradigm, people could have relied on the amount of information that came to mind, 
given the cue, when making their metamemory predictions. However, because of the
complexity of the scenes, the fact that the misled cues had been paired with two targets –
versus one for the control cues – was obscured. Therefore, a seemingly equal amount of 
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information in the misled condition was apparently not noticed, as evidenced by a lack of 
higher predictions in the misled than control condition, people also were not sensitive to 
the retrieval blocking that would occur in memory when making their predictions. 
Therefore, increasing the complexity did not result in metamemory predictions that 
tracked memory completely; rather the result was still a dissociation between memory
and metamemory. 
The hypothesis that accessibility would not be a useful heuristic in the more
complex eyewitness memory paradigm appears to be supported by the findings, as 
discussed. However, it could be the case that participants did not use the accessibility
heuristic, but instead, they simply didn’t have any reliable information on which to base
their predictions. Mean DJOLs for both control and misled items hovered around the 50 
percentage range. It seems that people couldn’t discern between control and misled items 
at all, so they simply predicted a 50/50 chance of recalling all items and were equally
confident in their answers for both control and misled items. Participants were either 
basing their predictions on accessibility–an equal amount of information available for
both control and misled items–or they simply did not have anything reliable on which to 
base their predictions. This possibility is negated by the comparison of DJOLs for 
recalled and unrecalled items. If people were simply making 50/50 guesses, DJOL
magnitude should not have varied with recall outcome, but it did. People provided higher 
DJOL predictions for recalled than unrecalled items. Apparently people were doing
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and which they would not–however, they were not aware of the future impact of 
interference on memory.
People could also have been relying on how familiar the cue was to them when 
making their predictions. In the control-present condition, the cue was not only seen in 
the slideshow, but also mentioned in the narrative in a generic way. Therefore, people 
were exposed to the cue twice in that condition as compared to the control-absent 
condition, in which there was no mention of the cue in the post-event narrative at all. If 
participants relied on cue familiarity to make their metamemory predictions, mean 
DJOLs should have been higher in the control-present than the control-absent condition. 
However, they were not; predictions were equal for the control-present and control-
absent conditions. Apparently people were not relying on familiarity with the cue when 
making their metamemory predictions. However, given that the complex context of the
eyewitness memory paradigm equalized the amount of information accessible for control 
and misled items, it could be that the multiple cue presentation was also obscured in this 
context, and people simply did not notice the second cue presentation in the control-
present condition. If this is the case, cue familiarity cannot be ruled out as an influence on 
metamemory predictions in this context.
Confidence judgments were collected to determine if the experience of 
interference during test would lead to a more accurate post-test metamemory judgment. 
However, mean CJs did not differ for control and misled items in either of the control 
conditions. The experience of interference during test did not improve the accuracy of 
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than misled items, they judged that their performance was the same for control and 
misled items. Confidence did vary with recall outcome; CJs were higher for recalled than 
unrecalled items. In addition, CJ magnitude was lower than DJOL magnitude, indicating
that recall confidence was more sensitive overall to interference at retrieval. However, the
predictions did not vary with the interference conditions. People were equally confident 
in their retrieval of the control and misled critical items.
Limitations of Study
Although an overall misinformation effect was obtained, recall accuracy for 
control critical items was low. Many participants could not recall even three of the 15 
control critical items, and five critical items were removed from the analysis because of 
unusually low recall performance (less than 20%). The low recall accuracy could have
resulted from the long delay between each slideshow presentation and the test because
four different slideshows were presented during the experiment. Presenting four
slideshows twice each resulted in a long wait time (i.e., approximately one hour) between 
the first slideshow presentation and the test. Counterbalancing the order of the slideshows 
was effective in that critical items from one particular show were not remembered at a 
higher rate than other shows, but the long distraction time between presentation and test 
resulted appeared to have negatively impacted memory performance, overall. In future
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Conclusions
In the complex context of the eyewitness memory paradigm, metamemory
predictions were not sensitive to the interference that occurred from misleading
information presented after the witnessed event. Although people remembered more
control than misled critical items, they predicted they would perform equally well in both 
conditions, and they were equally confident in their answers in both conditions. People 
could not accurately predict the effect of interference that would later occur in memory
performance, and even after experiencing interference at retrieval, their postdictions did 
not track the effect either. If people were relying on cue familiarity to make their
predictions, mean DJOLs should have been higher when the cue was presented multiple
times. However, mean DJOLs were equal in the control-present and control-absent 
conditions. Instead, people appeared to be relying on accessibility when making their
predictions. In the rich context of the eyewitness memory paradigm, because a relatively
equal amount of information was available for both control and misled critical items, 
participants predicted they would perform equally well for both conditions. The double 
dissociation obtained in prior research (Eakin, 2005) was not obtained, but metamemory
and memory were still dissociated. In the richer, more detailed context of the eyewitness 
memory paradigm, people still relied on the accessibility heuristic to inform their
metamemory predictions, resulting in a dissociation between memory and metamemory








































Template Created By: Damen Peterson 2009
REFERENCES
Burke, D. M., MacKay, D. G., Worthley, J. S., & Wade, E. (1991). On the tip of the
tongue: What causes word finding failures in young and old adults? Journal of 
Memory & Language, 30, 542-579.
Chandler, C. C. (1994). Studying related pictures can reduce accuracy, but increase
confidence, in a modified recognition test. Memory & Cognition, 22, 273-280.
Dunlosky, J., & Matvey, G. (2001). Empirical analysis of the intrinsic-extrinsic
distinction of judgments of learning (JOLs); Effects of relatedness and serial 
position on JOLs. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, &
Cognition, 27, 1180-1191.
Eakin, D. K. (2005). Illusions of knowing: Metamemory and memory under conditions of 
retroactive interference. Journal of Memory and Language, Special Issue, 52,
526-534.
Eakin, D. K., & Hertzog, C. (2006). Release from implicit interference in memory and 
metamemory: Older adults know that they can’t let go. Journal of Gerontology: 
Psychological Sciences, 61B, 340-347.
Eakin, D. K., & Hertzog, C. (2010a). Age invariance in feeling of knowing during
implicit interference effects. Manuscript under review.
Eakin, D. K., & Hertzog, C. (2010b). Immediate judgments of learning are insensitive to 
implicit interference effects at retrieval. Manuscript under review.
Eakin, D. K., Schreiber, T. A., & Sergent-Marshall, S. (2003). Misinformation effects in 
eyewitness memory: The presence and absence of memory impairment as a
function of warning and misinformation accessibility. Journal of Experimental
Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 29, 813-825.
Fischhoff, B., Slovic, P., & Lichtenstein, S. (1977). Knowing with certainty: The
appropriateness of extreme confidence. Journal of Experimental Psychology: 












































Template Created By: Damen Peterson 2009
Flavell, J. H. (1979). Metacognition and cognitive monitoring: A new area of cognitive-
developmental inquiry. American Psychologist, 34(10), 906-911.
Gillund, G., & Shiffrin, R. M. (1984). A retrieval model for both recognition and recall. 
Psychological Review, 97, 1-67.
Hart, J. T. (1965). Memory and the feeling-of-knowing experience. Journal of 
Educational Psychology, 56, 208-216.
Hart, J. T. (1967). Memory and the memory-monitoring process. Journal of Verbal 
Learning & Verbal Behavior, 6, 685-691.
Kimball, D. R., & Metcalfe, J. (2003). Delaying judgments of learning affects memory, 
not metamemory. Memory & Cognition, 31, 918-929.
Koriat, A. (1975). Phonetic symbolism and feeling of knowing. Memory & Cognition, 3, 
545-548.
Koriat, A. (1976). Another look at the relationship between phonetic symbolism and the
feeling of knowing. Memory & Cognition, 4, 244-248.
Koriat, A. (1993). How do we know what we know? The accessibility account of the
feeling of knowing. Psychological Review, 100, 609-639.
Koriat, A. (1997). Monitoring one’s own knowledge during study: A cue-utilization 
approach to judgments of learning. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 
126, 349-370.
Koriat, A., & Bjork, R. A. (2005). Illusions of competence in monitoring one’s 
knowledge during study. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, 
Memory, & Cognition, 31, 187-194.
Koriat, A., Lichtenstein, S., & Fischhoff, B. (1980). Reasons for confidence. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: Human Learning and Memory, 6, 107-118.
Leibert, T. W., & Nelson, D. L. (1998). The roles of cue and target familiarity in making
feeling of knowing judgments. American Journal of Psychology, 111, 63-75.
Loftus, E. F. (1991). Made in memory: Distortions in recollection after misleading
information. In G. H. Bower (Ed.), The psychology of learning and motivation: 










































   
 
 
Template Created By: Damen Peterson 2009
Maki, R. H. (1999). The roles of competition, target accessibility, and cue familiarity in 
metamemory for word pairs. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, 
Memory, and Cognition, 25(4), 1011-1023.
McCloskey, M., & Zaragoza, M. (1985). Misleading postevent information and memory
for events: Arguments and evidence against memory impairment hypothesis. 
Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 114, 1 – 16.
McGeoch, J. A. (1942). The Psychology of Human Learning (pp. 355- 467). New York: 
Longmans, Green and Co.
Metcalfe, J., Schwartz, B., & Joaquim, S. G. (1993). The cue familiarity heuristic in 
metacognition. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and 
Cognition, 19, 851-861.
Miner, A. C., & Reder, L. M. (1994). A new look at feeling of knowing: Its
metacognitive role in regulating question answering. In J. Metcalfe & A. P. 
Shimamura (Eds.), Metacognition: Knowing about knowing (47-70). Cambridge, 
MA: MIT press.
Nelson, T. O., & Dunlosky, J. (1991). When people’s judgments of learning (JOLs) are
extremely accurate at predicting subsequent recall: The “delayed-JOL effect.”. 
Psychological Science, 2(4), 267-270.
Nelson, T.O., & Dunlosky, J. (1992). How shall we explain the delayed-judgment-of-
learning effect? Psychological Science, 3(5), 317-318.
Nelson, T.O., Leonesio, R. J., Landwehr, R. S., & Narens, L. (1986). A comparison of 
three predictors of an individual’s memory performance: The individual’s feeling
of knowing versus the normative feeling of knowing versus base-rate item 
difficulty. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and 
Cognition, 12(2), 279-287.
Nelson, T. O., & Narens, L. (1990). Metamemory: A theoretical framework and new 
findings. In G. H. Bower (Ed.), The psychology of learning and motivation, 125-
173. New York: Academic Press.
Raaijmakers, J. G., & Shiffrin, R. M. (1981). Search of associative memory.
Psychological Review, 88(2), 93-134.
Rhodes, M. G., & Castel, A. D. (2008). Metacognition and part-set cuing: Can 































Template Created By: Damen Peterson 2009
Roediger, H. L., III, & Geraci, L. (2007). Aging and the misinformation effect: A 
neuropsychological analysis. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, 
Memory, and Cognition, 33(2), 321-334. doi:10.1037/0278-7393.33.2.321
Roediger, H. L., III, Jacoby, J. D., & McDermott, K. B. (1996). Misinformation effects in 
recall: Creating false memories through repeated retrieval. Journal of Memory 
and Language, 35, 300-318.
Schacter, D. L. (1983). Feeling of knowing in episodic memory. Journal of Experimental
Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 9, 39-54.
Schreiber, T. A., & Nelson, D. L. (1998). The relation between feelings of knowing and 
the number of neighboring concepts linked to the test cue. Memory and 
Cognition, 26(5), 869-883.
Schwartz, B. (1994). Sources of information in metamemory: Judgments of learning and 
feelings of knowing. Psychonomic Bulletin and Review, 1(3), 357-375.
Schwartz, B., & Metcalfe, J. (1992). Cue familiarity but not target retrievability enhances 
feeling-of-knowing judgments. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, 
Memory, and Cognition, 18, 1074-1083.
Slamecka, N. J. (1968). An examination of trace storage in free recall. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology, 76, 504-513.
Spellman, B. A., & Bjork, R. A. (1992). When predictions create reality: Judgments of 
learning may alter what they are intended to assess. Psychological Science, 3(5), 
315-316.
Vesonder, G. T., & Voss, J. F. (1985). On the ability to predict one’s own responses 






























































































   
Template Created By: Damen Peterson 2009
APPENDIX B
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cigarettes   Camel 
cigarettes  
R (letter on coffee 
mug) 
 J letter  
Bubblegum candy   Lifesavers  
Sunkist  7-Up soda  
Wrench tool   Hammer 
Yellow candle  Blue candle candle  
Bad  Thriller Record 
album 
 












sweatshirt   Mickey Mouse 
sweatshirt  
Black scarf  Red scarf Scarf  
Phone Electronic 
equipment 
  Calculator  
Vogue magazine  Esquire 
magazine 
Magazine  
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Earrings Jewelry   Bracelet  
Sunglasses  Wallets Accessories  
Gloves Clothing 
Accessory 
  Socks 







  Clock  
White bag   Green bag Bag  






  Candle 
Armchair  Bench Furniture  
Gold Watchband Watchband   Leather 
Watchband 





Germ X Hand 
Sanitizer 
  Purrell 
Pink Shirt  Blue Shirt Colorful 
Shirt 
 
German Book Reference 
Book 
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Example The Maintenance Man Control-Absent Counterbalance A Narrative
The petite, dark-haired secretary was standing and looking at her watch. With her 
burgundy colored leather purse on her shoulder and her sky blue umbrella in her hand, 
she looked as if she was ready to leave the office. Just then a man with a toolbox entered; 
he appeared to be a maintenance man. He was tall and thin, approximately six feet tall, 
had curly dark hair, and looked about 30 years old. He was wearing black, horn-rimmed 
glasses and was dressed in faded jeans and a dirty plain white T-shirt under a faded blue
flannel shirt. After the man had entered the office, the secretary pointed to a chair behind 
her desk and left. The man glanced at the chair, walked over to the file cabinet by the 
door, and moved a yellow coffeepot and a jar of Maxwell House coffee to make room for
his battered toolbox. He walked over behind the desk, got the swivel chair, and started 
toward the center of the room where there was more working space.  The chair was 
upholstered with dark red fabric. He turned the chair over, set it down and briefly
examined it. The man then reached over to his toolbox, pulled out a can of 3-in-1 
household lubricant and began to oil the chair. When he finished oiling the chair, he also 
tightened the screws holding the legs onto the bottom. 
When he was done working on the chair he carried it back to the original place
behind the secretary’s desk. He glanced at the desk, scanning the many objects on it. 
Among the objects were a black telephone, a can of Lysol, an Apple computer, and a blue 
IBM typewriter. He then noticed a Hochschilds shopping bag on the floor near the desk 
and bent down to take a look inside it. He reached into the bag and took out a light blue
sweater, a paperback book, and a Wilson tennis racket. He placed these items on the desk 
one by one. Lastly he took out a white sealed envelope. He held the envelope up to the
light to get a better look at its contents. Then he turned and reached past a mug with a 
kitten on it to get a silver letter opener. The letter opener was in a mug with the letter “J”
on it. He opened the envelope and found $20 in cash inside it.  He stuffed the money into 
his pocket and then proceeded to put everything else back into the shopping bag.
When he was finished, the man stood up, looked around the room, and started 
walking toward a desk on the other side of the room. He sat down at the desk and tried to 
open the drawer, but found that it was locked. He reached into his right pants pocket and 
took out several items including a red pocketknife. He put everything except the knife
back into his pocket. Using the knife, he attempted to unlock the desk drawer. As he was 
doing so, he noticed a set of keys on the far side of the desk near a 7up soft drink can. He
took the keys and found one that unlocked the drawer. He opened the drawer and found a
large black calculator with colored buttons on it among the pens and pencils. The man 
took the calculator, closed the drawer, put the keys back on the desk, and headed toward 
the door. Before reaching the door, he stopped at his toolbox, opened it, and hid the black 
calculator in it. Looking around, he saw the oilcan and rag he had used earlier on the
floor behind him. He got them and put them into his toolbox. He then moved toward the
door and cautiously peered out of the window. He opened the door a crack to take one
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Example The Maintenance Man Control-Present Counterbalance A Narrative
The petite, dark-haired secretary was standing and looking at her watch. With her 
burgundy colored leather purse on her shoulder and her sky blue umbrella in her hand, 
she looked as if she was ready to leave the office. Just then a man with a toolbox entered; 
he appeared to be a maintenance man. He was tall and thin, approximately six feet tall, 
had curly dark hair, and looked about 30 years old. He was wearing black, horn-rimmed 
glasses and was dressed in faded jeans and a dirty plain white T-shirt under a faded blue
flannel shirt. After the man had entered the office, the secretary pointed to a chair behind 
her desk and left. The man glanced at the chair, walked over to the file cabinet by the 
door, and moved a yellow coffeepot and a jar of Maxwell House coffee to make room for
his battered toolbox. He walked over behind the desk, got the swivel chair, and started 
toward the center of the room where there was more working space.  The chair was 
upholstered with dark red fabric. He turned the chair over, set it down and briefly
examined it. The man then reached over to his toolbox, pulled out a can of 3-in-1 
household lubricant and began to oil the chair. When he finished oiling the chair, he took 
a cigarette from the pack in his left shirt pocket.  He lit the cigarette and smoked it as he 
continued to work. Eventually, he reached over and put the cigarette out in a round, 
cream colored ashtray next to a fashion magazine on the end table.  
When he was done working on the chair he carried it back to the original place
behind the secretary’s desk. He glanced at the desk, scanning the many objects on it. 
Among the objects were a black telephone, a can of Lysol, an Apple computer, and a blue 
IBM typewriter. He then noticed a Hochschilds shopping bag on the floor near the desk 
and bent down to take a look inside it. He reached into the bag and took out a light blue
sweater, a paperback book, and a Wilson tennis racket. He placed these items on the desk 
one by one. Lastly he took out a white sealed envelope. He held the envelope up to the
light to get a better look at its contents. Then he turned and reached past a mug with a 
kitten on it to get a silver letter opener. The letter opener was in a mug with the letter “J”
on it. He opened the envelope and found $20 in cash inside it.  He stuffed the money into 
his pocket and then proceeded to put everything else back into the shopping bag.
When he was finished, the man stood up, looked around the room, and started
walking toward a desk on the other side of the room. He sat down at the desk and tried to 
open the drawer, but found that it was locked. He reached into his right pants pocket and 
took out several items: a small box of Anacin, a pack of candy, a nail clipper, and a red 
pocketknife. He put everything except the knife back into his pocket. Using the knife, he
attempted to unlock the desk drawer. As he was doing so, he noticed a set of keys on the
far side of the desk near a 7up soft drink can. He took the keys and found one that 
unlocked the drawer. He opened the drawer and found a large black calculator with 
colored buttons on it among the pens and pencils. The man took the calculator, closed the 
drawer, put the keys back on the desk, and headed toward the door. Before reaching the 
door, he stopped at his toolbox, opened it, lifted a tool out of it, and slid the black 
calculator beneath it. Looking around, he saw the oilcan and rag he had used earlier on 
the floor behind him. He got them and put them into his toolbox. He then moved toward 










   


















   
 
   
  
   
   







more look out. Finally, he stepped outside of the office carrying his toolbox and shut the 
door behind him
The Maintenance Man Example MOT Questions
1. Sam sat his toolbox down on the filing cabinet after entering the room. There was a jar 
of instant coffee next to a yellow coffeepot on the file cabinet.  What brand of coffee was 
it?  (Hint: the correct answer is not Maxwell House)
2. While Sam was working on the chair, he took a cigarette from a pack and lit it. What 
brand of cigarettes did he smoke? (Hint: the correct answer is not Camels)
3. Sam removed a silver letter opener from a mug with a letter on it to open the envelope 
in which he found the $20 in cash. What letter was on the coffee mug? (Hint: the correct 
answer is not “R”)
4. As Sam sat down at the desk, he removed some items including a pack of candy from 
his pocket and sat them on the desk. What type of candy did he lay on the desk? (Hint:
the correct answer is not Lifesavers)
5. There was a can of soda on the desk near the keys to the desk drawer.  What brand of
soda was it?  (Hint: the correct answer is not 7-Up)
6. The maintenance man lifted a tool out of his toolbox and placed the calculator beneath 
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Research Consent Form
Mississippi State University Deborah K. Eakin, Ph.D.
Department of Psychology Assistant Professor
Mississippi State, MS  39762 227 Magruder Hall
Office: 325-7949 Lab: 325-5804
You are being asked to be a volunteer in a research study. The purpose of this form is to tell you 
about the study you will be participating in today and to inform you about your rights as a
research volunteer. Before you participate, you should read this consent form carefully and 
completely. You will be given a copy of this consent form to keep and you do not waive any of
your legal rights by signing this consent form.
Thank you for volunteering to participate in this study. Our work could not be done without your
help and willingness to give of your time and yourself.
Purpose of the Study:
Our research focuses generally on the ability of people to remember information presented on a 
series of slides or video and their ability to predict their memory performance on a future test. 
Procedure of the Study:
If you decide to be in this study, you will be asked to watch four events presented as slideshows 
and read an accompanying narrative for each slideshow. Your memory for details of the events 
will be tested at the end of the experiment. The experiment is expected to last approximately 90 
minutes.
Discomfort and Risks:
There are no major physical discomforts involved in this study. Risks are minimal and do not
exceed those of normal office work.  Please tell us if you are having trouble with any task or if
you need additional rest and the investigator will be happy to accommodate you in any way
possible. If you feel any discomfort, please tell the person assisting you immediately. 
Benefits:
This study will provide knowledge of how memories are processed and how well individuals can 
predict their memory performance on future tasks. You are not likely to benefit personally in any
way from joining this study, but thanks to the willingness of people like you, we will continue to 
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Confidentiality:
All of your responses will be kept strictly confidential. To protect the confidentiality of this 
information, we will assign your data a code number that will only be known to the members of
the research project. All of the information which you provide us today will be marked with the 
code number, not your name. All information will be stored in a computer for analysis using only
your code number for identification. The information collected during the study will be used 
solely for the purpose of understanding memory processes and, once it is tabulated, the 
information will be used only in group form. No indication of your individual answers to 
questions will be given to anyone. We want you to be completely confident that you may feel free
to answer all questions without concern that it may affect you in any way.
Compensation:
The study will take 1 to 1.5 hours, and you will be reimbursed for your participation. You will
receive ½  research credit for every half-hour of participation. We want you to know, however, 
that you are free to change your mind and withdraw from this research at any time. There will be 
no penalty for doing so. You will receive compensation equal to the time involved in the study. 
However, you will receive no less than ½ a research credit.
Contact Information:
If there are problems that arise during your participation, please feel free to contact Dr. Deborah
Eakin (662-325-7949) at Mississippi State to discuss the problems. If you have any questions 
about the research procedures described above, please feel free to talk with the person assisting
you or contact Dr. Eakin. For additional information regarding your rights as a research subject, 
please feel free to contact the MSU Regulatory Compliance Office at 662-325-5220 or via email 
at irb@research.msstate.edu. Again, we are grateful for your help and want to make sure that your
participation is a pleasant experience. Following your participation, you will be provided with a 
complete explanation of why this study was conducted.
Participant Consent:
I have read (and have been told) the information above.  The researchers have answered my
questions to my satisfaction and they have given me a copy of this form.  I consent to take part in 
this research study.
Participant's  signature  ___________________________________  Date __________________
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